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Several divergent perspectives on narcissism have guided 
theory and research in recent years (e.g., Kernberg, 1975; 
Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Westen, 1990). But across 
the spectrum of clinical, developmental, and social-
personality theories of narcissism, grandiosity seems to 
be the most central characteristic (Buss, 1991). The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) 
lists a grandiose sense of self-importance as the primary 
element of narcissism, along with an excessive need for 
the admiration of others, arrogance, a sense of “unique-
ness” and entitlement, a lack of empathy, envy, and a 
tendency to exploit others.
Somewhat consistent with these defining characteris-
tics, studies suggest that people with high scores on the 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Hall, 
1979) tend to react in self-serving and aggressive ways 
to self-esteem threats (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998) 
and exhibit excessive emotional volatility following 
positive and negative feedback (Rhodewalt & Morf, 
1998). Furthermore, studies show that high scores on 
the NPI are associated with high self-esteem and self-
focused attention (Emmons, 1987; Morf & Rhodewalt, 
1993; Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991), need for 
power (Carroll, 1987), and interpersonal dominance 
(Brown & Zeigler-Hill, 2004). Likewise, high scores on 
the NPI are associated with low levels of agreeableness, 
high levels of extraversion (Rhodewalt & Morf, 1995), 
and a low need for intimacy (Carroll, 1987).
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For three decades, social-personality research on overt 
narcissism has relied almost exclusively on the 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI). However, the 
NPI suffers from a host of psychometric and validity 
concerns that make composite NPI scores (summed 
across its subscales) difficult to interpret. The present 
studies propose that narcissistic characteristics tend to 
fall under two general clusters: grandiosity and entitle-
ment. The studies show that measures of grandiosity 
and entitlement interact to predict scores on the NPI, 
controlling for gender, self-esteem, and basic personality 
(Study 1), but also that grandiosity and entitlement 
function independently with respect to mental health 
(Study 2) and ethical misconduct (Study 3). Together, 
these results challenge the view of overt narcissism as a 
unidimensional construct and underscore the impor-
tance of distinguishing between grandiose and entitled 
aspects of the narcissistic self-concept.
Keywords: narcissism; grandiosity; entitlement; mental health; 
misconduct
Narcissism is one of the oldest constructs in the his-tory of psychology, but for most of this history it 
has developed under the guidance of psychodynamic 
theorists. Over the past several decades, however, nar-
cissism has received increasing attention by social and 
personality psychologists, perhaps as an outgrowth 
of their corresponding interest in self-esteem and self- 
regulation. As social-personality research on narcissism 
progresses with increasing methodological and statisti-
cal sophistication, it might be time to rethink the way we 
approach narcissism, both theoretically and empirically. 
The present studies present an alternative to the common 
conceptualization and measurement of narcissism and 
suggest that an appreciation of the dimensionality of the 
narcissistic self is crucial to understanding the construct. 
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Critique of the NPI
Most studies on narcissism within social-personality 
psychology operationally define high levels of narcis-
sism as high scores on the NPI. However, the meaning 
of scores on this scale remains obscured by a haze of 
psychometric and validity questions. For example, the 
factor structure of the NPI has been in question since its 
inception. The scale was originally published in a 54-item, 
forced-choice format without subscales (Raskin & Hall, 
1979). In two validation studies, Emmons (1984, 1987) 
suggested a 37-item, forced-choice format with four 
subscales: leadership/authority (L/A), self-admiration/
self-absorption (S/S), superiority/arrogance (S/A), and 
exploitiveness/entitlement (E/E). Raskin and Terry 
(1988) later argued for a 40-item, forced-choice meas-
ure with seven subscales: authority, exhibitionism, superi-
ority, entitlement, exploitativeness, self-sufficiency, and 
vanity. A more recent analysis of the NPI identified only 
three factors (Kubarych, Deary, & Austin, 2004). 
Nevertheless, most researchers who use the NPI to assess 
narcissism simply sum across the subscales to create a 
total score. This scoring approach might be partly due to 
the generally poor reliability of the subscales, with alphas 
in large samples ranging from .42 to .75 (e.g., Trzesniewski, 
Donnellan, & Robins, 2008).
Both the 37- and 40-item versions of the NPI are 
widely used, either with or without their respective sub-
scales. However, when researchers report subscale cor-
relates, they most frequently focus on the E/E factor. 
This factor, when reported, often diverges empirically 
from the other subscales of the NPI. For example, 
Rhodewalt and Morf (1995) reported that although the 
total NPI was strongly correlated with self-esteem and 
self-certainty, E/E was unrelated to both. In the same 
study, the total NPI was negatively related to the magni-
tude of actual-ideal self-discrepancies, but E/E was posi-
tively related to these self-discrepancies. E/E was also 
negatively related to perceived social support, unlike the 
total NPI. Likewise, Hickman and colleagues found that 
the total NPI predicted optimism, low hopelessness, and 
high expected positive affect, but E/E was unrelated to 
all of these variables (Hickman, Watson, & Morris, 
1996). Differences between the E/E subscale and the 
total NPI appear with respect to other variables as well, 
including several basic personality dimensions (Hendin 
& Cheek, 1997) and interpersonal forgiveness (Exline, 
Baumeister, Bushman, Campbell, & Finkel, 2004).
Besides these psychometric problems, the content of the 
NPI has also come under fire. Echoing Emmons (1987), 
Rosenthal and Hooley (2008) have argued that although 
some of the items on the NPI seem to capture narcissistic 
features (e.g., arrogance and exploitiveness), other items 
reflect qualities that are not necessarily narcissistic (e.g., 
leadership). In one study, Rosenthal and Hooley had clini-
cians rate each item of the NPI for how well it reflected 
narcissistic tendencies. On the basis of these ratings, 
Rosenthal and Hooley separated the items into three sets 
representing a high, moderate, or low degree of narcis-
sism, and correlated scores on these three item sets with 
scores on an index of narcissistic personality disorder 
(NPD) derived from the DSM-IV-TR, and a measure of 
healthy self-esteem. Results indicated that the highly nar-
cissistic set of NPI items was strongly correlated with the 
NPD measure but not with healthy self-esteem, whereas 
the opposite was true for the least narcissistic set of NPI 
items. Thus, besides being psychometrically weak, many 
of the items on the NPI do not appear to reflect narcis-
sism at all, making summary scores across the NPI sub-
scales conceptually ambiguous. 
In addition to the occasional reference to differences 
among subscale correlates, some researchers have used the 
factors of the NPI to distinguish between so-called adap-
tive and maladaptive types of narcissism. Watson and col-
leagues, for instance, have capitalized on the difference 
between scores on the E/E subscale and total NPI scores by 
using the E/E scale as a measure of maladaptive narcissism 
and a composite of the remaining subscales as a measure 
of adaptive narcissism (e.g., Soyer, Rovenpor, Kopelman, 
Mullins, & Watson, 2001; Watson & Biderman, 1993; 
Watson & Morris, 1990; see also Dickinson & Pincus, 
2003). This line of research suggests that the NPI might 
simply be capturing two distinct but equally legitimate 
forms of narcissism, although this conclusion depends on 
whether the adaptive form is really anything more than 
normal self-esteem or self-confidence (see Sedikides, 
Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004). Related 
arguments have been made about overt and covert types of 
narcissism (Wink, 1991). Although the validity of the cov-
ert narcissism construct is questionable, most social-
personality research has focused on overt narcissism, the 
typical measure of which remains the NPI. 
Grandiosity and Entitlement as a 
Dimensional Framework
If the NPI appears insufficient as a measure of overt 
levels of narcissism, and most alternative measures, 
which are typically based on the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory (e.g., Hendin & Cheek, 1997; 
Wink, 1991), lack even the modest degree of face valid-
ity exhibited by the NPI, how else might we measure 
this fascinating construct? One approach is to start with 
the defining characteristics of narcissism listed in the 
DSM-IV-TR, just as Raskin and Hall (1979) did with 
the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(3rd ed.; DSM-III), and devise items that reflect these 
defining characteristics. Our own examination of these 
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characteristics led us to conclude that they form two 
clusters: one that is primarily intrapersonal and con-
cerned with a grandiose sense of self-importance, and 
one that is more interpersonal and concerned with an 
entitled, socially objectifying sense of the self in relation 
to others. These intrapersonal and interpersonal clusters 
are interesting to consider in light of their overlap with 
the agency and communion distinction within the inter-
personal circumplex model of personality (Leary, 1957; 
Wiggins, 1979). Indeed, interpersonal circumplex research-
ers have argued that narcissism reflects a combination 
of a high degree of agency (e.g., a sense of power, status, 
and independence) and a low degree of communion 
(e.g., a lack of interpersonal warmth and a rejection of 
affiliative qualities; see also Ruiz, Smith, & Rhodewalt, 
2001; Wiggins & Pincus, 1994). This high-agency and 
low-communion model is consistent with our sugges-
tion of an intrapersonal–interpersonal distinction among 
the defining features of narcissism in the DSM-IV-R, 
although the overlap between these models is imperfect, 
particularly given that high agency is considered to be 
an interpersonal dimension within the circumplex 
framework, whereas grandiosity is more of an intraper-
sonal dimension in our framework. 
The interpersonal circumplex provides a potentially 
useful framework for relating narcissistic tendencies to 
basic dimensions of personality. Nonetheless, we believe 
that scales designed to measure agency and communion 
are unlikely to be especially effective at capturing the 
pathological extremity of narcissistic characteristics. 
What, then, can be used to assess the interpersonal and 
intrapersonal aspects of narcissism within the dimen-
sional framework that we are proposing? We suggest 
that two recently developed scales might capture the 
essence of the intrapersonal and interpersonal clusters 
of narcissistic characteristics described in the DSM. 
Specifically, we propose that Rosenthal, Hooley, and 
Steshenko’s (2007) Narcissistic Grandiosity Scale cap-
tures the overinflated sense of arrogant self-importance 
that is one of the central features of narcissism. Indeed, 
the items on the Narcissistic Grandiosity Scale (which 
we describe in more detail in Study 1) provide one of the 
best descriptions of narcissistic self-inflation that we 
have seen in the narcissism literature. 
Alongside this intrapersonal dimension, we believe 
that Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, and Bushman’s 
(2004) Psychological Entitlement Scale captures the 
sense of interpersonal deservedness and objectification 
of others that seem to lie at the heart of the interper-
sonal dimension of narcissism. Although other perspec-
tives on this interpersonal dimension might emphasize 
different relational aspects of narcissism, such as a lack 
of empathy or aggressiveness, we believe that these 
qualities may be secondary emotional and behavioral 
manifestations of the objectifying belief of the narcissist 
that, as Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, Elliot, and Gregg 
(2002) described it, “others exist for me.” Studies by 
Campbell et al. on the interpersonal consequences of 
entitlement beliefs support this assertion, alongside 
other studies showing that the E/E subscale of the NPI 
often carries the bulk of the variance in antisocial feel-
ings and behaviors associated with the full NPI (e.g., 
Exline et al., 2004; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1995). Thus, 
although other approaches to this interpersonal dimen-
sion might be fruitful, we suspect that the belief that one 
is entitled to more goods, more benefits, and more rights 
than are other people adequately captures the heart of 
this dimension.
In the present studies, we examine scores on the NPI 
(Study 1), indices of mental health (Study 2), and 
aspects of misconduct (Study 3) as a function of narcis-
sistic grandiosity and entitlement. In all three studies, 
we examine both the main effects and the interaction of 
grandiosity and entitlement. If narcissism entails both a 
high degree of grandiosity and a high degree of entitle-
ment, one of two outcomes should occur. First, grandi-
osity and entitlement might evidence independent, 
additive associations with the outcome variables of 
interest, such that the highest scores on our dependent 
measures would be obtained by people who are high in 
both grandiosity and entitlement. Second, grandiosity 
and entitlement might interact monotonically, which 
would indicate a synergistic version of the independent-
but-additive pattern. With either of these two patterns, 
narcissistic individuals would be those high in both the 
intrapersonal and the interpersonal characteristics 
described in the DSM-IV-TR. If either of these patterns 
does not appear, we might need to rethink what it 
means to be a narcissist. We also include the NPI itself 
in these studies to replicate previous findings with this 
measure while demonstrating the value of taking a 
more nuanced, dimensional approach to the narcissism 
construct.
STUDY 1: GRANDIOSITY, 
ENTITLEMENT, AND THE NPI
Given the tendency of social and personality research-
ers to rely so heavily on the NPI, Study 1 investigated 
scores on the NPI as a function of grandiosity, entitlement, 
and their interaction, along with gender and healthy self-
esteem. Furthermore, we investigated the associations 
between each of these scales and the dimensions of the Big 
Five, with particular emphasis on extraversion and agree-
ableness, in keeping with previous arguments that narcis-
sism can be described as a combination of high extraversion 
and low agreeableness (e.g., Paulhus, 2001). 
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Method
Participants and Procedure
Seven hundred fifty-four participants completed the 
narcissism measures as part of a larger, online survey in 
partial fulfillment of a research exposure requirement 
in introductory psychology at The University of 
Oklahoma. However, 14 participants did not provide 
complete responses to the other personality or self-
esteem scales that we examined in this study, so their 
data were excluded from all analyses, leaving a total of 
740 participants (460 females, 280 males) in the final 
sample. Of these, approximately 76% identified them-
selves as Caucasian, 6% as Black, 5% as Native American, 
7% as Asian or Pacific Islander, 3% as Hispanic or 
Latino/a, and 2% as Other. 
Measures
All measures described here were administered in 
individually randomized orders, along with a battery of 
additional attitude and personality scales unrelated to 
the present investigation.
Narcissism. Three measures of narcissism were admin-
istered. First, we administered the 37-item, forced-choice 
version of the NPI (Emmons, 1987). On this scale, par-
ticipants chose which items within 37 pairs described 
them best. Example pairs include “When people compli-
ment me I sometimes get embarrassed” versus “I know 
that I am good because everybody keeps telling me so,” 
and “I like having authority over other people” versus 
“I don’t mind following orders.” Cronbach’s alpha for the 
total NPI was good (α = .83). Each of the four NPI sub-
scales described by Emmons (1984, 1987) was also calcu-
lated, and subscale reliability estimates were, predictably, 
less impressive than for the total scale (αs = .57, .59, .65, 
and .78 for E/E, S/A, S/S, and L/A, respectively). 
In addition to the NPI, we also administered Rosenthal 
et al.’s (2007) Narcissistic Grandiosity Scale and Campbell 
et al.’s (2004) Psychological Entitlement Scale. The gran-
diosity scale (α = .95) contains 16 trait adjectives or 
phrases, and respondents are directed to rate the extent 
to which each describes them “in general” using 7-point 
Likert scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). 
Example items are “perfect,” “glorious,” and “omnipo-
tent,” which clearly reflect a grandiose sense of self-
importance. The entitlement scale (α = .88) contains nine 
statements with which respondents rate their agree-
ment on 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Example statements 
are “I honestly feel I’m just more deserving than others” 
and “I feel entitled to more of everything.” As these 
examples show, the face validity of the grandiosity and 
entitlement scales is high, and consistent with their strong 
internal reliability estimates, prior evidence reveals them 
to be valid, unidimensional indices of their respective con-
structs (Campbell et al., 2004; Rosenthal et al., 2007). 
Big Five. For our secondary analyses, we administered 
John, Donahue, and Kentle’s (1991) Big Five Inventory 
(BFI), a widely used instrument that assesses the five basic 
personality domains of extraversion, agreeableness, neu-
roticism, conscientiousness, and openness to experience. 
In the current sample, reliability estimates for each 
dimension were good, ranging from α = .78 (conscien-
tiousness) to α = .87 (extraversion). Respondents rated 
the extent to which each of these statements was true for 
them using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
Self-esteem. Scores on the NPI are typically correlated 
with measures of self-esteem, depending on the extent to 
which those measures are oriented toward social domi-
nance (Brown & Zeigler-Hill, 2004). To assess a rela-
tively non-narcissistic facet of healthy self-esteem as a 
control variable, we administered the 10-item Rosenberg 
Self-Esteem Scale (RSE; Rosenberg, 1965). Example items 
from the RSE (α = .89) are “I feel that I’m a person of 
worth, at least on an equal basis with others” and “On 
the whole, I am satisfied with myself.” Respondents rated 
the extent to which each of these statements was true for 
them using a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). 
Results
Zero-Order Associations
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for and intercor-
relations among the measures of narcissism, personality, 
and self-esteem. Grandiosity and entitlement were sig-
nificantly correlated with one another (r = .44), and both 
were also correlated with the NPI as well as each of its 
subscales. However, grandiosity (r = .54) was more 
strongly related to the total NPI than was entitlement 
(r = .36), t(737) = 5.47, p < .001, just as with the RSE, 
t(737) = 6.45, p < .001. The correlation between the RSE 
and the NPI (r = .16) fell between the correlations of the 
RSE with grandiosity and entitlement. Grandiosity was 
somewhat more strongly correlated with each of the sub-
scales of the NPI than was entitlement, with the excep-
tion of the NPI’s E/E subscale, which was more strongly 
correlated with the entitlement scale than with grandios-
ity, t(737) = 3.04, p < .01. Grandiosity and entitlement 
showed generally modest associations with the facets of 
the BFI, with grandiosity (r = .27) correlating more 
strongly with extraversion than entitlement did (r = .03), 
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t(737) = 6.42, p < .001, but entitlement (r = -.19) corre-
lating more strongly with agreeableness than grandiosity 
did (r = -.03), t(737) = 4.18, p < .001. The NPI correlated 
even more strongly with extraversion (r = .44) than gran-
diosity did (r = .27), t(737) = 5.33, p < .001, and slightly 
more strongly with agreeableness (r = -.23) than entitle-
ment did (r = -.19), t < 1, ns. Thus, scores on the NPI 
were somewhat more reducible to facets of normal per-
sonality than were scores on the grandiosity and entitle-
ment scales. Small but significant gender differences 
appeared on most of the measures (and their respective 
subscales), with the exception of the leadership/authority 
subscale of the NPI and the entitlement scale.
Plotting the NPI With Grandiosity 
and Entitlement
We next examined grandiosity and entitlement and 
their interaction (after mean-centering both variables; 
Aiken & West, 1991) as predictors of NPI scores in a 
multiple regression equation. In this analysis, we con-
trolled for gender (coded as 0 = female, 1 = male) and 
the RSE. Grandiosity (β = .47, p < .001, d = 0.99) and 
entitlement (β = .14, p < .001, d = 0.31) each accounted 
for unique variance in NPI scores. Furthermore, grandi-
osity and entitlement also interacted significantly (β = .12, 
p < .001, d = 0.28) such that the highest scores on the 
NPI were obtained by respondents who scored high on 
both grandiosity and entitlement, as shown in Figure 1. 
Gender was also a significant factor in this analysis (β = .07, 
p < .05, d = 0.17), but the zero-order association 
between the RSE and the NPI was no longer significant 
with grandiosity and entitlement in the model (β = .02, 
ns). This model accounted for approximately 33% of 
the variance in NPI scores.
Disagreeable Extraverts?
Paulhus (2001) and others have proposed that narcis-
sism might reduce simply to high extraversion and low 
agreeableness. We examined this notion by adding the 
mean-centered BFI extraversion and agreeableness 
subscales—as well as their interaction—to the prior regres-
sion equation predicting scores on the NPI. Results of this 
analysis, which are shown in Table 2, revealed that gender, 
agreeableness, and extraversion (but not the Agreeableness 
× Extraversion interaction) were all statistically significant 
predictors of NPI scores, but despite these covariates, gran-
diosity, entitlement, and their interaction still accounted 
for significant variance in NPI scores, and the pattern of 
their associations with the NPI remained essentially 
unchanged from what is shown in Figure 1. This full 
model accounted for approximately 50% of the variance 
in NPI scores, a substantial increase from the model that 
did not include agreeableness and extraversion.
Discussion
The focus of Study 1 was on the associations between 
scores on the NPI and two indices of narcissistic charac-
teristics—specifically, a grandiose self-image and a sense 
of special entitlement. Grandiosity and entitlement were 
positively related to each other, but this relation was only 
moderate in magnitude. Thus, grandiosity and entitle-
ment appear to capture distinguishable constructs despite 
both appearing to be overtly narcissistic. Furthermore, 
grandiosity and entitlement accounted for unique vari-
ance in scores on the NPI, and they significantly inter-
acted, such that the highest NPI scores were predicted 
by high scores on both grandiosity and entitlement; 
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Low (–1 SD) High (+1 SD)
Entitlement
Sc
o
re
s
 
o
n
 
th
e
 
N
PI
Low Grandiosity High Grandiosity
Figure 1 NPI scores as a function of narcissistic grandi-
osity and entitlement. 
NOTE: NPI = Narcissistic Personality Inventory 
TABLE 2 Regression Results Predicting NPI Scores in Study 1  
(N = 740)
Variable B SEB β d
Gender 1.31 0.34 .10** 0.28
RSE 0.01 0.03 .01 0.03
Agreeableness (A)  –2.77 0.30  –.26** 0.68
Extraversion (Ex) 3.29 0.23 .41** 1.06
A × Ex 0.08 0.33 .01 0.02
Grandiosity (G) 1.88 0.17 .34** 0.80
Entitlement (E) 0.82 0.17 .15** 0.36
G × E 0.41 0.12 .09* 0.26
Note. R2 = .50. Gender coded as 0 = female, 1 = male. RSE = 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale.
*p < .01. **p < .001.
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however, absent high grandiosity, entitlement was not 
strongly related to the NPI. These associations occurred 
despite our controlling for basic facets of personality, 
gender, and healthy self-esteem.
Some evidence in Study 1 supported the notion that 
narcissists are “disagreeable extraverts” (Paulhus, 2001). 
For example, scores on the NPI were positively related 
to extraversion and negatively related to agreeableness. 
However, extraversion and agreeableness did not inter-
act to predict scores on the NPI, and the interaction 
between grandiosity and entitlement predicting the NPI 
held even when agreeableness and extraversion (and 
their interaction) were added to the model. Thus, these 
analyses suggest that although people with high scores 
on the NPI might tend to be disagreeable extraverts, this 
is not all they are. That extraversion and agreeableness 
remained significantly related to the NPI in the model 
that included grandiosity and entitlement is also inter-
esting. This result shows that the NPI reflects more than 
just the grandiose sense of self-importance and special 
sense of entitlement that we have argued form the core 
of the intrapersonal and interpersonal dimensions of the 
narcissism construct. Whether this “more” indicates a 
strength or a weakness of the NPI depends on the valid-
ity of our model and of the grandiosity and entitlement 
scales as measures of the core features of narcissism. 
We should also note that the data from Study 1 sup-
port our concerns about the meaning of composite 
scores on the NPI. The correlations in Table 1 reveal 
that the subscales of the NPI did not operate consist-
ently with respect to measures of grandiosity, entitle-
ment, self-esteem, or basic personality. For example, 
although L/A and S/S both correlated positively with 
self-esteem, S/A did not, and E/E correlated negatively 
with self-esteem. This pattern seems problematic for 
interpreting the meaning of scores on the NPI and its 
subscales. What, after all, does it mean to score high on 
a measure of “superiority and arrogance” without scor-
ing high in self-esteem? Other differences between the 
NPI subscales can also be seen in their associations with 
the facets of the BFI. For instance, extraversion varied 
widely in its association with the NPI subscales, ranging 
from a high of r = .62 with L/A to a low of r = –.01 with 
E/E. Likewise, subscale correlations with agreeableness 
ranged from a high of r = –.43 with E/E to a low of r = –.04 
with L/A. Other distinct patterns of association between 
the facets of the BFI and the subscales of the NPI also 
occurred, and these distinctions call into question the 
validity of computing a “total narcissism score” by sim-
ply summing across the NPI subscales. Indeed, a parallel 
might be drawn between summing across the subscales 
of the NPI to create a “total narcissism score” and 
summing across the dimensions of the Big Five to create 
a “total personality score.”
How, then, should researchers measure narcissism? 
Summing across the NPI’s subscales seems inappropri-
ate, given the large differences in associations between 
these subscales. However, simply treating these sub-
scales independently is also problematic, given the 
rather modest reliability of the subscales (in this and 
most other studies that report them), and a careful 
examination of the actual items of the NPI calls into 
question what some of them are really measuring. 
Although the NPI has performed well enough to be used 
repeatedly in social-personality research over the last 
several decades, we are left to wonder why it does so. In 
other words, what aspects of narcissism captured by the 
NPI are responsible for the significant associations 
between total NPI scores and the host of antecedents 
and consequences that prior research has revealed? In 
the next two studies, we address this question by exam-
ining grandiosity and entitlement in the context of men-
tal health (Study 2) and misconduct (Study 3), 
contrasting the results obtained with these alternative 
indices of narcissistic characteristics and results obtained 
using the NPI.
STUDY 2: NARCISSISM AND MENTAL HEALTH
Study 2 examined the associations between narcissis-
tic grandiosity, narcissistic entitlement, and four indices 
of mental health. If narcissistic grandiosity reflects 
a defensive, compensatory self-inflation, its relation to 
mental health might be negative insofar as defensive 
compensation strategies exist to mask underlying 
insecurities and pathologies. However, the same self-de-
ceptive cognitive style that would support a grandiose 
self-concept could also facilitate the sorts of positive illu-
sions that seem to enhance subjective well-being (Taylor 
& Brown, 1988). This perspective on the nature of nar-
cissistic grandiosity would lead to the hypothesis that 
grandiosity should be positively associated with mental 
health. This argument is also consistent with research by 
Sedikides et al. (2004), who found that scores on the NPI 
were positively associated with self-report measures of 
mental health and that this association was mediated 
fully by self-esteem. Because grandiosity covaries with 
normal self-esteem (Study 1), just as scores on the NPI 
do (Emmons, 1987), self-esteem might also account for 
the association between grandiosity and well-being, a 
possibility that we examined in the present study. 
In contrast, we did not expect narcissistic entitlement 
to be predictive of well-being. Although the additive and 
interactive models of narcissism would predict that indi-
viduals high in both grandiosity and entitlement ought 
to exhibit the highest levels of any variable attributable 
to the construct of narcissism, we see little reason to 
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expect that people high in entitlement would be particu-
larly happy, optimistic, or satisfied with their lives. This 
skepticism is consistent with prior research on mental 
health and the NPI, which has not found the E/E factor 
to be positively associated with well-being (e.g., Hickman 
et al., 1996), as well as with the failure of entitlement 
scores in Study 1 to be strongly related to self-esteem. 
Thus, even though grandiosity and entitlement inter-
acted to predict NPI scores in Study 1, and NPI scores 
have been positively associated with mental health in 
previous studies (e.g., Sedikides et al., 2004), we did not 
expect either an additive or an interactive model to hold 
in this study because of the hypothesis that high levels 
of entitlement would not be positively associated with 
well-being. 
Method
Participants and Procedure
Three hundred six undergraduates (213 female, 93 
male; mean age = 19.3 years) at The University of 
Oklahoma participated in an online survey in exchange 
for credit toward a research exposure requirement in 
their introductory psychology courses. Approximately 
78% of the sample self-identified as Caucasian, 6.6% as 
Asian or Pacific Islander, 5.2% as Black, 4.6% as 
Hispanic or Latino/a 3.6% as Native American, and 
2.6% as Other (or did not indicate an ethnicity). 
Participants completed the questionnaires described 
here, along with several other measures unrelated to the 
present study, in individually randomized orders.
Measures
As in Study 1, participants completed the NPI along 
with measures of grandiosity and entitlement, all of 
which demonstrated strong internal reliability (αs = .85, 
.95, and .86, respectively). The failure of 18 participants 
to complete the entire NPI resulted in only 288 respond-
ents for the NPI analyses. Restricting the sample to 
these 288 participants did not alter any of our results in 
a meaningful way, so we retained all available partici-
pants for the grandiosity and entitlement analyses.
To assess mental health, we administered four meas-
ures. Participants completed the Centers for Epide-
miological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 
1977), a widely used measure of depression. On the 
CES-D, participants rated the frequency with which 
they had experienced symptoms characteristic of depres-
sion within the past week, on a 4-point scale ranging 
from 0 (rarely or none of the time) to 3 (most or all of 
the time). Example items from this 20-item scale (α = .91) 
include “I felt depressed” and “I felt that I could not 
shake off the blues even with help from my family or 
friends.” A second dimension of well-being was assessed 
with Diener, Emmons, Larsen, and Griffin’s (1985) 
Satisfaction With Life (SWL) scale. Examples of this 
5-item scale (α = .86) include “In most ways my current 
life is close to my ideal” and “I am satisfied with my 
life.” Participants rated their level of agreement with 
each item on the SWL on 7-point Likert scales ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Finally, 
participants completed the Revised Life Orientation 
Test (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994), which 
is divided into 3-item subscales for optimism (α = .70) 
and pessimism (α = .76). Example items include “In 
uncertain times, I usually expect the best” and “I rarely 
count on good things happening to me.” Participants 
rated their level of agreement with the items on 5-point 
scales ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree 
strongly). Finally, we administered the 10-item RSE to 
capture self-esteem (α = .89) as a possible mediator of 
the associations between our measures of narcissism 
and mental health.
Results
Correlations among the measures of grandiosity and 
entitlement, the NPI, mental health, and self-esteem are 
presented in Table 3. As this table shows, grandiosity 
was significantly associated with all four indices of men-
tal health. Similar, albeit weaker, associations were 
obtained with the NPI. In contrast, scores on the entitle-
ment scale were only weakly associated with optimism 
(r = .13, p < .01) and were not significantly associated 
with any other mental health measure, despite being 
correlated with both grandiosity (r = .49, p < .001) and 
the NPI (r = .43, p < .001). The RSE was moderately 
associated with grandiosity, entitlement, and the NPI, 
and strongly associated with all four measures of mental 
health, although its association with entitlement was 
small (r = .15, p < .01).
Because conducting separate mediation models for 
each mental health measure increases Type I errors, we 
created a composite mental health score by performing a 
principal components analysis on our four mental health 
measures, which resulted in a single factor that accounted 
for 62% of the total variance (eigenvalue = 2.48). We 
retained an overall mental health factor score from this 
factor analysis for use in our primary analyses.
Our first set of analyses attempted to replicate the 
results of Sedikides et al. (2004) with our mental health 
composite, which included two of the measures used by 
Sedikides et al. (depression and life satisfaction) as well 
as two additional measures (optimism and pessimism). We 
first examined the association between self-reported men-
tal health and the NPI. Controlling for gender (β = –.04, 
ns, d = 0.09), we found that the NPI was significantly 
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associated with mental health (β = .22, p < .001, d = 
0.45). Likewise, the NPI was significantly associated 
with the RSE (β = .29, p < .001, d = 0.60). Next, we 
assessed the association between scores on the RSE and 
mental health, again controlling for gender. As expected, 
the RSE was strongly associated with mental health (β = .74, 
p < .001, d = 2.18), although gender was not (β = .01, 
ns, d = 0.01). Thus, self-esteem was associated with 
both the NPI and mental health, making it a possible 
mediator of the NPI–mental health association. To test 
this possibility, we included the RSE in the model with 
the NPI and gender and found that although the RSE 
remained a significant predictor of mental health (β = .73, 
p < .001, d = 2.02), the NPI was no longer significant 
(β = .01, p < .001, d = 0.02). A Sobel test (Sobel, 1982) 
revealed that the association between the NPI and men-
tal health was significantly reduced with the RSE in the 
model, z = 4.89, p < .001. Thus, the RSE fully mediated 
the association between the NPI and our mental health 
composite, consistent with the results reported by Sedikides 
et al. (2004).
We next investigated the associations between gran-
diosity, entitlement, and their interaction with respect to 
scores on the mental health composite, controlling for 
gender, after first centering the continuous predictors on 
their means (Aiken & West, 1991). This analysis revealed 
that grandiosity was positively associated with self-
reported mental health (β = .43, p < .001, d = 0.80). In 
contrast, entitlement was negatively associated with 
mental health (β = –.19, p < .01, d = 0.34). This negative 
association stands in contrast to the absence of a zero-
order association between entitlement and the mental 
health composite (r = .04, ns), indicating a suppression 
effect by grandiosity. Neither the Grandiosity × Entitlement 
interaction (β = .07, ns, d = 0.14) nor gender (β = –.08, 
ns, d = 0.17) was a significant predictor in this model. 
We next analyzed scores on the RSE as a function of 
grandiosity and entitlement. In this model, only gran-
diosity was significantly associated with self-esteem 
(β = .43, p < .001, d = 0.81). In a final step, we 
regressed our mental health composite on all predictor 
variables simultaneously and found that the RSE remained 
a significant predictor (β = .71, p < .001, d = 1.94), as did 
both grandiosity (β = .13, p = .01, d = 0.30) and enti-
tlement (β = –.14, p < .01, d = 0.35). A Sobel test 
revealed that the association between grandiosity and 
mental health was significantly reduced with the RSE 
in the model, z = 6.53, p < .001, even though grandios-
ity remained a significant predictor. Thus, self-esteem 
partially mediated the positive association between 
grandiosity and mental health but did not mediate the 
negative association between entitlement and mental 
health.
As a final, supplementary analysis, we attempted to 
replicate the interaction between grandiosity and enti-
tlement predicting total NPI scores. A regression analy-
sis (R2 = .38) that included gender as a control variable 
(β = .10, p < .05, d = 0.25) revealed that both grandios-
ity (β = .47, p < .001, d = 1.01) and entitlement (β = .20, 
p < .001, d = 0.42) independently predicted total NPI 
scores, but their interaction was not significant (β = .08, 
p > .10, d = 0.19). Despite this failure to replicate the 
small but significant Grandiosity × Entitlement interac-
tion found in Study 1, the magnitude of the association 
was similar across studies.
Discussion
As Study 2 demonstrates, the linkages between nar-
cissism and mental health appear to be a bit more com-
plex than has been suggested by some studies relying on 
NPI scores to operationalize narcissism. When narcis-
sistic grandiosity and entitlement are measured sepa-
rately, these dimensions appear to relate differently to 
mental health. When analyzed simultaneously, grandi-
osity was positively associated with mental health, 
whereas entitlement was negatively associated with 
mental health. Furthermore, self-esteem partially medi-
ated the association between grandiosity and mental 
health but did not do so for entitlement. In contrast, and 
in keeping with recent research by Sedikides et al. 
(2004), self-esteem fully mediated the association between 
TABLE 3: Zero-Order Correlations Among Variables in Study 2 (N = 288-306)
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 8
1. Grandiosity — .49 .58 –.28  .26  .26 –.20  .39
2. Entitlement  — .43 –.05  .02  .13  .08  .15
3. NPI   — –.19  .14  .20 –.15  .29
4. Depression     — –.57 –.45  .47 –.62
5. Satisfaction     —  .50 –.48  .65
6. Optimism      — –.51  .56
7. Pessimism       — –.49
8. Self-esteem        —
NOTE: All correlations > |.12| are significant at p < .05. NPI = Narcissistic Personality Inventory.
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the NPI and mental health. Thus, the patterns obtained 
with the narcissistic dimensions of grandiosity and enti-
tlement were not the same as the pattern obtained with 
the NPI, even though the former accounted for substan-
tial variance in the latter.
The present results also cast doubt on the broad asser-
tion that even “normal narcissists” are mentally healthy, 
a conclusion that depends entirely on the operationaliza-
tion of narcissism via the NPI, which may be too strongly 
confounded with simple self-esteem to be of much use 
with regard to assessing the association between narcis-
sism and well-being. Indeed, the mediational role of self-
esteem between scores on the NPI and various indices of 
mental health led Sedikides et al. (2004) to “wonder 
whether the NPI captures a great deal of variance over 
and above that associated with unusually high self-
esteem” (p. 413). We share this concern and believe that 
alternative operationalizations of narcissism might shed 
more light on how and why narcissistic tendencies might 
or might not be associated with mental health. In fact, 
whereas narcissistic entitlement was negatively associ-
ated with mental health in Study 2, narcissistic grandios-
ity remained positively related to mental health even 
after controlling for self-esteem, suggesting that at least 
this facet of narcissism is not fully reducible to simple 
self-esteem in its association with well-being. It may well 
be that the mechanisms that support the belief that one 
is omnipotent, glorious, and perfect also foster positive 
illusions that blunt the impact of life’s trials and tribula-
tions, contributing to subjective well-being beyond the 
well-documented benefits of high self-esteem (Taylor & 
Brown, 1988). Of course, because the present data are 
correlational, we must be cautious in inferring a causal 
link between these constructs.
STUDY 3: NARCISSISM AND MISCONDUCT
So far, we have examined the distinctions between 
grandiosity and entitlement with respect to self-report 
variables. In Study 3, we investigated a behavioral 
variable—specifically, two forms of cheating. Von 
Hippel, Lakin, and Shakarchi (2005) distinguished 
between deliberative cheating, in which people explic-
itly intend to engage in misconduct, and rationalized 
cheating, in which people do not explicitly intend to 
engage in misconduct but are able to “spin” their behavior 
in such a way that they can construe it as something other 
than cheating. In Study 3, we used the paradigm devised 
by von Hippel et al. to examine the ability of grandiosity 
and entitlement to predict these forms of misconduct.
Based on data from Studies 1 and 2, we hypothesized 
that narcissistic entitlement would be more strongly 
related to deliberative cheating than would grandiosity. 
Not only was entitlement more strongly related to low 
levels of agreeableness (a trait that reflects an explicitly 
prosocial orientation) than was grandiosity, but Campbell 
et al.’s (2004) research revealed that higher entitlement 
scores were predictive of a greater propensity to engage 
in antisocial behavior, including stealing candy from 
children. Thus, entitlement appears to reflect an overt 
rejection of social norms, which suggests that people 
high in entitlement are likely to ignore moral or ethical 
prohibitions against deliberative cheating. In contrast, 
we hypothesized that grandiosity would be more strongly 
related to rationalized cheating than would entitlement. 
Grandiosity appears to reflect a self-serving mind-set 
that goes beyond mere high self-esteem, potentially pro-
moting a sense of subjective well-being (consistent with 
the correlational data reported in Study 2) that might 
facilitate the kind of subtle “spin” that underlies ration-
alized cheating. 
As in Studies 1 and 2, we also explored the efficacy 
of the NPI in predicting our misconduct measures. 
Because total NPI scores are more strongly related to 
grandiosity than entitlement, we expected that if the 
NPI were able to predict cheating behavior at all, it 
would be more likely to mirror the hypothesized asso-
ciation between grandiosity and rationalized cheating 
than between entitlement and deliberative cheating.
Method
Participants
Participants were 93 undergraduates from introduc-
tory psychology courses at The University of Oklahoma. 
As compensation, participants received one credit 
toward their research exposure requirement. At least 3 
weeks before participating, participants completed the 
NPI and the same measures of grandiosity and entitle-
ment used in Studies 1 and 2. Data from 8 participants 
were excluded because of extreme suspicion (n = 2), 
procedural errors (n = 4), or missing data on one or 
more predictors (n = 2), leaving a final sample of 85 
participants (62 females, 23 males), of which approxi-
mately 78% were Caucasian. 
Procedure
Our procedure followed closely that described in von 
Hippel et al. (2005). All participants were told that we 
were interested in testing the validity of a new compu-
terized test examining cognitive ability. This “Mental 
Math Task” consisted of two sets of 10 equations each. 
Each equation consisted of 10 numbers that participants 
were to add or subtract as directed. The equation would 
repeat until the participant provided the correct 
answer. 
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Participants were told that because we wanted people 
to perform as well as possible, the highest scorer would 
receive a $30 prize at the end of the study. Thus, par-
ticipants believed they were in competition with other 
participants for this prize. At this time, participants 
were informed of an unfortunate “bug” with the test 
program. The experimenter explained that this program 
was originally designed for another study by the experi-
menter’s advisor. In the original study, the answers were 
meant to appear automatically, but the experimenter 
was unable to remove this feature without crashing the 
program. The experimenter then went on to explain 
that this glitch should not be a problem because the 
answer would not appear if a response box were already 
on the screen. This response box would appear as soon 
as participants hit the spacebar on their keyboard. 
Hence, participants could prevent the answer from 
appearing by simply hitting the spacebar after each 
equation appeared. The experimenter emphasized the 
importance of promptly hitting the spacebar when the 
equation appeared and assured participants that they 
would have as much time as needed to solve each prob-
lem after the response box came up. The experimenter 
explained that it took about 10 s for the answer to appear 
during the first set of 10 equations, so the participant 
would have plenty of time to hit the spacebar. Following 
von Hippel et al. (2005), we operationalized deliberative 
cheating as the number of times participants failed to hit 
the spacebar within the 10-s time frame.
After the first set of equations, the experimenter went 
on to explain, the program would inform the partici-
pant that the second set was about to begin. In the sec-
ond set, however, the answer appeared after only about 
1 s. Participants were told that it might be more difficult 
to hit the spacebar in time in this set, so they should try 
to hit the spacebar immediately after the questions 
appeared in the second set. Following von Hippel et al. 
(2005), we operationalized rationalized cheating as the 
number of times participants failed to hit the spacebar 
within the 1-s time frame, controlling for the amount of 
cheating in the 10-s set (because those who deliberately 
cheat are likely to do so in both sets, controlling for 
levels of deliberative cheating in the 10-s set leaves a 
residual level of cheating in the 1-s set attributable pri-
marily to rationalization processes). After giving par-
ticipants a final reminder that the response box would 
only appear if they hit the spacebar, the experimenter 
left them alone to complete the task.
Following the math task, participants completed several 
additional measures unrelated to the present study and 
were then thoroughly probed for suspicion and debriefed. 
Because participants were not actually competing for $30, 
at the end of the study, the experimenter entered each par-
ticipant’s name in a drawing for the $30 prize.
Results and Discussion
Cheating
Not surprisingly, cheating occurred significantly more 
often in the 1-s set (M = 2.89, SD = 3.34) than in the 
10-s set (M = 1.88, SD = 2.74), t(80) = 4.05, p < .001, 
presumably reflecting the greater ease of rationalizing 
misconduct in the former. These results parallel those 
obtained by von Hippel et al. (2005), although our 
cheating levels were somewhat lower than those reported 
in von Hippel et al.’s studies.
Regression Analyses
The primary analyses involved determining which 
dimension of narcissism was a significant predictor of 
cheating in the 10-s and 1-s sets. For these analyses, 
narcissistic grandiosity and entitlement were each mean-
centered before the creation of an interaction term 
(Aiken & West, 1991). When cheating in the 10-s set 
was regressed on gender, grandiosity, entitlement, and 
the Grandiosity × Entitlement interaction, only entitle-
ment was a significant predictor of deliberative cheating 
(β = .26, p < .05, d = .46; all other ps > .30). Entitlement 
and grandiosity did not interact significantly to predict 
deliberative cheating.
For rationalized cheating, we first regressed cheating 
levels in the 1-s set on deliberative cheating in the 10-s 
set and saved the standardized residuals. Examination 
of these standardized residuals revealed the presence of 
two outliers approximately 3 SD above the mean, which 
we removed before conducting our final analysis (removal 
of these individuals’ data did not change the results in 
the 10-s set). After regressing rationalized cheating on 
gender, grandiosity, entitlement, and the Grandiosity × 
Entitlement interaction, only gender (β = –.22, p < .05, 
d = .46) and grandiosity (β = .22, p < .05, one-tailed, 
d = .40) predicted rationalized cheating. Neither entitle-
ment nor the Grandiosity × Entitlement interaction was 
even close to being significant (ps > .20). Thus, entitle-
ment predicted deliberative cheating, whereas grandios-
ity predicted rationalized cheating, as hypothesized.
In the previous analyses, we determined that grandi-
osity and entitlement uniquely predicted different types 
of cheating, but how would the NPI fare as a predictor 
of misconduct? To answer this question, we regressed 
both rationalized and deliberative cheating on gender 
and the NPI. The NPI predicted rationalized cheating to 
a similar degree as grandiosity (β = .19, p < .05, one-
tailed, d = .39) but was not predictive of deliberative 
cheating (β = .15, p > .15, d = .30). Thus, even though 
the NPI was able to predict rationalized cheating with 
similar effectiveness compared to grandiosity, it was 
unable to predict deliberative cheating very well. 
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Consistent with data from Study 2, narcissistic 
grandiosity and entitlement did not interact to predict 
the two forms of cheating we examined in this study. 
Rather, they functioned independently of one another, 
not simply by accounting for unique variance in cheating 
scores in an additive fashion but by actually predicting 
different types of cheating. This pattern of distinct asso-
ciations complements the results of Study 2, in which we 
found that grandiosity and entitlement were differentially 
associated with mental health. Additionally, the inability 
of the NPI to predict behavior associated with narcissistic 
entitlement provides further support for the advantages 
of a reliable, multidimensional approach to narcissism.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Given the interest value of narcissism and its place of 
importance in the history of psychology, it seems odd that 
social and personality psychologists have relied almost 
exclusively on a single operational definition of this 
construct—specifically, scores on the NPI. Indeed, we can 
think of no other topic in all of psychology in which such 
an overreliance has occurred to the extent that it has with 
narcissism. We believe it is time that researchers recon-
sider how they think about and measure this construct, 
for both practical and theoretical reasons.
In the present research, we have suggested that a 
dimensional approach encompassing both an intraper-
sonal sense of grandiosity and an interpersonal sense of 
entitlement might effectively capture the essence of nar-
cissism. With this dimensional model in mind, we used 
two reliable and face-valid measures of grandiosity and 
entitlement and associated these measures with scores on 
the NPI and the Big Five, indices of mental health, and 
two forms of cheating. Only with respect to scores on 
the NPI did grandiosity and entitlement interact, and the 
magnitude of that interaction was modest. In all other 
cases, grandiosity and entitlement behaved independ-
ently of one another or even exerted suppressor effects 
on one another. Indeed, the failure to discover any inter-
actions between grandiosity and entitlement with respect 
to an outcome other than scores on the NPI calls into 
question the importance of that single interaction, par-
ticularly in light of prior criticisms of this scale. Although 
parallel associations with mental health have been 
obtained with a division of the NPI into a two-factor 
combination of its subscales (e.g., Watson & Biderman, 
1993), the mediocre levels of face validity (especially 
L/A) and poor reliability (especially E/E and S/A) of the 
NPI subscales make them less than ideal for capturing 
narcissistic grandiosity and entitlement, in contrast to 
the highly face-valid and reliable scales that we used in 
the present research (see also Campbell et al., 2004). 
The present studies, of course, are not without imp-
ortant limitations. First and foremost, the majority of 
the evidence we report was based on self-report, both 
on the predictor and criterion sides of the equation. The 
only exceptions to this design limitation were the meas-
ures of deliberative and rationalized cheating in Study 3. 
In addition, although we captured several classes of 
outcomes associated with scores on the NPI in prior 
research (as well as predicting NPI scores themselves), 
the present studies certainly do not exhaust the range of 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors theoretically associ-
ated with narcissism. For example, one of the most 
interesting manifestations of narcissistic egoism can be 
seen in the aggressive responses to negative feedback 
exhibited by people with high scores on the NPI. 
Although Campbell et al. (2004) found that entitlement 
was predictive of aggressive responses to negative feed-
back, a measure of grandiosity was not included in 
Campbell et al.’s study, so we cannot be certain whether 
this aggression was primarily a function of grandiosity 
or entitlement, or whether it might be even greater 
among people high in both grandiosity and entitlement. 
Additional studies that distinguish between these possi-
ble sources of narcissistic rage could provide valuable 
insights into this particularly dark side of narcissism.
We should also note the possibility that the grandios-
ity and entitlement scales we used in these studies might 
not be adequate to capture the intrapersonal and inter-
personal facets of the narcissism construct. Social exploi-
tation in particular is not directly measured by the 
entitlement scale, and exploitation of others appears as 
a major factor in many discussions of the narcissistic 
personality (cf. Buss, 1991). Although we acknowledge 
this limitation, it seems reasonable to predict that social 
exploitation, lack of empathy, and other interpersonal 
characteristics described in classic treatments of narcis-
sism might be subsumed under an entitlement factor 
(Campbell et al., 2004), just as many, if not all, of the 
self-enhancing characteristics attributed to narcissism 
might be subsumed under a grandiosity factor. Indeed, 
we recently obtained evidence consistent with this argu-
ment with respect to self-enhancing social comparisons, 
control beliefs, and empathy (Budzek & Brown, 2008), 
but additional research is clearly needed to extend this 
line of evidence to other variables. 
The crucial question now, we suggest, is what to do 
with the narcissism construct itself. The only data we 
have across the present three studies that grandiosity 
and entitlement interact with one another are with 
respect to the NPI. Otherwise, these dimensions appear 
to operate independently of one another. Furthermore, 
grandiosity and entitlement demonstrated distinct asso-
ciations with respect to mental health (Study 2) and 
misconduct (Study 3) rather than merely accounting for 
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unique but additive variance in these outcomes. These 
patterns are inconsistent with the expectation that nar-
cissism reflects a special combination of high grandios-
ity and high entitlement. Rather, the present studies 
suggest that either high grandiosity or high entitlement 
might be sufficient to indicate a narcissistic style of 
thinking, feeling, or behaving. 
Keeping these narcissistic dimensions distinct in 
both theory and practice could clarify some of the con-
tradictory conclusions in the narcissism literature, such 
as the question of whether narcissism levels are rising 
in American culture (Trzesniewski et al., 2008, vs. 
Twenge, Konrath, Foster, Campbell, & Bushman, 2008) 
and whether narcissists are truly low in implicit self-
esteem (Campbell, Bosson, Goheen, Lakey, & Kernis, 
2007, vs. Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & 
Correll, 2003). Perhaps only the sense of entitlement, 
but not grandiosity, is rising in contemporary American 
culture (see Trzesniewski et al., 2008), and maybe gran-
diosity and entitlement are uniquely related to implicit 
self-esteem (or even to different types of implicit self-
esteem, consistent with distinctions suggested by 
Campbell et al., 2007). Ignoring the differences between 
grandiosity and entitlement in favor of a simpler, unidi-
mensional narcissism construct could lead to more 
confusion than clarity regarding such important issues 
as cultural change and nonconscious elements of the 
self-concept. 
Indeed, given the present data, we are forced to won-
der whether we need an overarching narcissism construct 
at all or whether it might be more appropriate simply to 
treat grandiosity and entitlement as distinct elements of 
the self-concept and to measure either or both of these 
dimensions directly, depending on the research question 
at hand. Clearly, more research needs to be conducted to 
address these issues, but we hope the present studies 
further this debate. Our understanding of what it means 
to be narcissistic will surely grow through such dis-
course, however difficult it might be to offer up such a 
sacred cow on the altar of scientific progress. 
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